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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) estimates that 
the ‘threshold of sustainability’ of elephant and rhino populations was crossed in 2010 
(IUCN, 2014). At this time, poaching levels outweighed birth rates resulting in the 
steady decline of species populations to date (IUCN, 2014). The trafficking of 
wildlife ranks fourth as the most lucrative transnational crime after arms, drugs and 
people (Roe, 2015).  
 Poaching has been escalating as the demand for ivory and rhino horn from 
Asia is rapidly increasing. Simultaneously, large-scale organized crime and militant 
groups also profit from the revenues generated by the illicit trade (Maguire & 
Haenlein, 2015). This has repercussions for both national and international security 
and stability (UNODC, 2010). These security implications conceal a wider 
development issue. Elephants and rhinos are an important economic asset for rural 
communities, providing a foundation for the sustainability of the wildlife-tourism 
sector. The depletion of elephant and rhino populations as a result of exploitation 
from poaching restricts opportunities for socio-economic development at local and 
international levels.   
 There is no simple resolution to poaching and the illicit wildlife trade. 
However, initiatives to attempt to tackle the phenomenon can be divided into three 
approaches; the reduction of demand, increased security and law enforcement, and 
community driven socio-economic development through the support of alternative 
livelihoods. The primary focus of research in this field has been on the first two 
approaches, with limited regard to the third. As such, this paper will not focus on the 
demand side drivers of the industry, but rather conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
security based and socio-economic solutions.  
 This thesis aims to encourage future research to increase its focus on the 
socio-economic drivers of poaching and its respective top-down or bottom-up 
solutions. Ideally, through a more inclusive approach to the issue by equally 
addressing all three aforementioned dimensions, anti-poaching strategies will be 
better able to tackle both the supply and demand side drivers of the industry - thus 
offering more effective solutions to poaching and the international crime driven by it.  
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
 With the creation of socio-economically driven conservation programs, 
alternative livelihoods and economic benefits can be brought to local communities 
that depend on stable wildlife populations. Examples of such initiatives includes: 
sustainable tourism, agricultural development, land-leasing and employment of 
community members in conservation and protection activities (Biggs et.al. 2016). 
Hopefully, through such initiatives the incentive to poach and engage in wildlife 
crime will decrease, and communities will have greater interests as well as the 
financial capabilities to protect the rhino and elephant populations from poaching 
activities.  
 In addition, external threats such as terrorist organizations and criminal 
networks pose a direct challenge to governments, communities and conservationists. 
Socio-economically and community driven approaches alone are not able to fully 
address the problem of these external actors. This increases the need for government 
intervention and concrete security based strategies that offer the appropriate 
mechanisms to combat the activities of criminal syndicates.  
 Due to the multifaceted nature of the problem, the security and socio-
economic aspects of poaching need to be addressed on both a domestic and 
international scale. Therefore, this master’s thesis will attempt to answer the question: 
under what conditions are top-down and bottom-up approaches effective?  
 
CONTEXT 
Elephant and Rhino Poaching 
 Poaching is defined as the hunting, killing or stealing of animals without legal 
permission, thus violating local and international conservation laws. Elephants are 
hunted for their valuable ivory, which is primarily used in China and South East Asia 
as traditional medicine or to make ornaments and jewelry (BBC, 2015).  Rhino horn 
is similarly used as traditional medicine or as a status symbol in China and Vietnam 
(WWF, 2017).  
 Ivory is harvested by cutting the trunk off the elephant and splitting the skull 
to remove the tusks. Likewise, rhino horn is sawed off the rhinos head or cut out of its 
face with an axe. Elephants and rhinos are usually either shot down with guns or by 
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the more traditional use of poison arrows. At times, animals are still alive during the 
harvesting process if shot incorrectly (WWF, 2011). Three men can kill about 27 
elephants in ten minutes (Vaughan, 2016). 
  
Conservation Aspect 
 A study produced by the United Nations Environment Program and Interpol, 
suggests that “...the monetary value of all transnational organized environmental 
crime is approximately 213 billion USD annually” (Nellemann et.al, 2014:7). This 
means that the illegal industry deprives developing nations of billions of dollars in 
lost revenues and development opportunities (Nellemann et.al, 2014).  The portion of 
this industry represented by wildlife alone is between 7 billion and 23 billion USD 
annually (Muruthi, 2015). Many iconic wildlife species are on the brink of extinction, 
specifically the African rhino and elephant, which are poached at rising levels for 
their valuable horns and ivory as demand from Asia continues to increase. Between 
2007 and 2014 in South Africa alone, rhino poaching increased by 9000% (Scriber, 
2014). From 2010-2012, more than 100,000 African elephants were illegally poached 
across the African continent (Scriber, 2014). In the timeframe between 1979 and 
2007, African elephant populations decreased from 1.3 million to only 427,000 
(Steyn, 2016). In 2011, elephant poaching contributed to 75% of all elephant deaths 
(Scriber, 2014).  
 These species are a part of Africa’s natural heritage and the region has a 
tourism industry that is highly dependent on the survival of its wildlife (UNWTO, 
2015). Wildlife tourism represents 80% of the total annual vacations to Africa sold, 
with wildlife safari as the most popular tourism product (UNWTO, 2015). Elephant 
and rhino expeditions are one of the most popular activities attracting tourists 
(UNWTO, 2015). 
 The eradication of the rhino and elephant would not only represent a historic 
international conservation failure, but also strongly dent the economic revenues of 
wildlife tourism in the region - an industry that many livelihoods are dependent upon. 
According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization, a 2013 estimate 
showed that African tourism was conservatively valued at 34.2 billion USD and 
continues to grow by 6.1% annually (Muruthi, 2015).  
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 Furthermore, the eradication of Africa’s megafauna has serious impacts on 
ecosystems. Africa’s elephants are referred to as mega-gardeners as they are capable 
of shaping and changing the landscapes of their territories through the maintenance of 
grasslands, soils, clearing of trees and bush and seed distribution through dung (Steyn, 
2016). 
 The illegal poaching and trafficking of ivory and rhino horn is a multi-billion 
dollar industry (Duffy, 2016; Nelson et.al, 2016). Demand for ivory alone has 
expanded over the last years. Rhino horn trades at higher prices than gold or heroin 
(Duffy, 2016). However profitable the product, the main bulk of revenue does not go 
to the original poacher, but instead helps fund criminal networks that fuel corruption 
and conflict which put both local and international communities at risk (Nellemann 
et.al, 2014).   
 Furthermore, as anti-poaching mechanisms are becoming increasingly more 
violent in order to meet the violence of poachers, the risks of the industry have 
heightened dramatically for those who are engaged in both poaching and anti-
poaching initiatives. Techniques for successful poaching mitigation are debated. On 
one hand, top-down anti poaching strategies that mainly focus on increased law 
enforcement and military strategies and technology aim to protect wildlife 
populations through violent means, high fines, imprisonment and even death. On the 
other hand, community based bottom-up approaches aim to curb poaching by 
engaging local communities in wildlife conservation through the provision of 
economic opportunities and alternative livelihoods as part of conservation initiatives.   
 The need to research bottom-up solutions derives from the fact that top-down 
mechanisms primarily focus on the security factors that drive poaching rather than the 
development of socio-economic strategies. In contrast, bottom-up solutions usually 
encompass the social and economic reform needed to aid in reducing the root-causes 
at the community level that drive incentives to engage in poaching activities. 
 Although bottom-up focused strategies alone are not a panacea for tackling 
poaching (probably a balance of both top-down and bottom-up is needed), bottom-up 
driven solutions have proven to be successful in case studies selected for this study, 
which include; Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa and Kenya (Roe, 2015). In these 
regions national parks, both socio-economic and security focused strategies have been 
implemented to combat poaching for rhino horn and ivory.  
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Security Aspect 
 Not only is poaching a conservation issue, but it is increasingly becoming a 
security and humanitarian one too. Ivory and rhino horn has become a form of ‘bush 
currency’ that funds the operations of militias, rebels and terrorist organizations 
across boarders (Vira & Ewing, 2014). The illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn 
represents a major security challenge, not only in Africa but also internationally. The 
illicit trade of ivory and rhino horn does not only impacts species populations, but has 
a significant human impact as well. The resource is one of the most valuable sources 
of illicit contraband for criminal syndicates in the region, fueling regional security 
risks and instability (Vira & Ewing, 2014; Poe, 2014; Peters, 2015).  Heavily armed 
groups of poachers outgun protectors and impose a threat to communities and 
conservation activities. The strengthening of field protection and top-down solutions 
is essential for successful anti-poaching operations on the ground. Additionally, by 
promoting community engagement and enhancing their participation as rangers or 
observers, community driven efforts aid in creating a more transparent environment 
for disrupting poaching activities (Lambin, 2015).   
 An 18 month long investigation commissioned by the Elephant Action League 
(2011) established a direct connection between the ivory trade and the Al-Qaeda 
affiliate Al-Shabaab (Poe, 2014; Kalrom et.al, 2013). The investigation found that the 
terrorist organization generated between 200,000 and 600,000 USD a month from 
tusks, accounting for 40% of its operating budget (Kalrom et.al, 2013). East Africa 
has become ground zero for poaching activities (Christy, 2015; Poe, 2014). Militias 
and terrorist groups are usually poaching outside their home countries, coming from 
the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Sudan and Chad - five of the world’s most fragile regions on the international 
fragility index (Christy, 2015). Due to high levels of poaching and dwindling 
elephant and rhino populations in these nations, poachers are now moving across 
boarders into neighboring countries where conservation activities have been 
relatively successful (Schiffman, 2014; Kalrom et.al, 2013). Sudan has no elephants 
left and some of the most horrific elephant killings trace back to poacher-terrorists 
such as the Sudanese Janjaweed or other Sudanese cross-continental marauders, who 
now are venturing into Kenya and Tanzania (Christy, 2015).  
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 Although the relationship between terrorism and poaching has recently been 
receiving more attention by researchers and academics, it is a phenomenon that has 
been largely overlooked. There is a major gap in literature that thoroughly explores 
the connections between terrorism and poaching. Therefore, it is impossible to 
sufficiently counter the problem of poaching by criminal syndicates, as it is not yet 
fully understood.  
 There is a vital need to strengthen conservation activities. The fact that 
criminal organizations are using revenues from ivory and rhino horn to fund terrorism 
adds to the urgency of the issue. The collusion of two evils- poaching and terrorism- 
is not only an African issue, but also an international one.  
 
Definitions  
 For the purpose of this study, bottom-up strategies are defined as community-
driven solutions for poaching mitigation, where on the other hand, top-down 
strategies represent government-driven solutions. Furthermore, ‘militarized means’ 
are defined as the use of military grade equipment and techniques like helicopters, 
drones, machine guns, infrared scopes and heavy armored vehicles. For top-down 
approaches this also includes the deployment of armed forces and police cooperation 
with rangers when engaging in conservation activities. Notably, ‘sustainable’ and 
‘effective’ anti-poaching schemes refers to the degree of success of poaching 
mitigation activities. For the purpose of this study, ‘degree of success’ refers to an 
absence of decline in elephant and rhino populations on a country basis, where they 
are either remaining at stable population numbers or even increasing in numbers of 
animals per herd and whether the species is on the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Convention on International Trade of Endangered 
Species (CITES) Appendix I or Appendix II.  Success also entails that the number of 
animals found dead due to poaching is decreasing, where even if heard populations 
are decreasing overall, the dead animals found perished due to unrelated causes (Roe, 
2015). The purpose of conservation is to ensure the survival of a species in the future. 
Therefore, it is important to consider whether conservation should increase its focus 
towards economic and societal programs that drive community incentives to engage 
in the protection of species, or to continue the development of military style strategies 
that fight the external actors that feed the crime of poaching itself.    
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RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 Literature concerned with a comparative view of bottom-up and top-town anti-
poaching initiatives does not exist. Most academic literature concerning socio-
economically or security driven approaches is descriptive. Literature on both bottom-
up and top-down approaches is mainly contributed by research institutions, think-
tanks and non-governmental organizations through a limited number of case studies 
and analyses of the case study findings by scholars. Academic literature on bottom-up 
and top-down driven approaches to poaching analyses each method within its own 
context, without drawing on a comparison on the effectiveness of the two methods 
combined. Bottom-up approaches are understudied; its popularity only recently 
increasing as poaching for ivory and rhino horn is escalating (Scriber, 2014; Steyn, 
2016). Furthermore, bottom-up approaches are less frequently implemented in 
national parks than top-down strategies. There are significant gaps in academic 
literature that study the socio-economic and security drivers of poaching and that 
explore the relationship between poaching and international crime and terrorism. It is 
important for future research to bridge these gaps in order to aid in the development 
of more comprehensive, sustainable anti-poaching strategies. The literature review is 
organized as following: (1) bottom-up approaches, (2) top-down approaches.  
 
(1) Bottom-up approaches 
 Bottom-up approaches are community driven solutions that aim to tackle the 
socio-economic and security factors that drive incentives to poach, usually at 
community level. The focus by conservationists on socio-economic anti-poaching 
strategies on the supply side of the industry is a relatively new phenomenon compared 
to the prevalence of mainly security driven top-down strategies. A growing field of 
literature analyses the mechanisms and importance of bottom-up solutions to socio-
economic issues in conservation efforts. In this area of research, poaching is linked to 
issues of poverty, land management and lack of alternatives to poaching (Challender 
& MacMillan, 2014; Pye-Smith, 2013; John et.al, 2013).  From the literature it can be 
gathered that in order to prevent people from resorting to poaching for financial gains, 
opportunities for alternative livelihoods need to be created as part of conservation 
efforts (Challender & MacMillan, 2014; Pye-Smith, 2013; John et.al, 2013; Knapp, 
2017).  
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 One of the major weaknesses of bottom-up solutions to poaching is that 
security issues and protection mechanisms against external actors are not addressed. 
This represents a problematic downfall as poachers who are affiliated to criminal 
networks are becoming increasingly more militarized and violent, requiring equal 
measures of response.  
 Literature exploring bottom-up solutions predominantly links poaching with 
issues of poverty (Knapp et.al, 2017; Roe, 2015; Booker et.al, 2017). A report 
commissioned by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
during the Botswana African Elephant Summit in 2008, established a direct link 
between poverty and poaching by drawing a comparison between infant mortality 
rates and poaching rates (IUCN, 2013). Infant mortality often serves as an indicator of 
poverty (WHO, 2007; Sen, 1998) The report suggested that in areas experiencing high 
levels of poverty, levels of poaching were substantially higher as well (IUCN, 2013). 
The report also found increased poaching levels in areas with higher corruption and 
weaker governance (IUCN, 2013) However, according to the World Economic 
Forum, these crimes are opportunistic rather than poverty driven (Hickey, 2015). In 
some regions with high poverty, locals do not poach but instead poaching is carried 
out by outside criminal networks that enter communal land (Hickey, 2015). 
Nonetheless, poaching has also been attributed to contributing to poverty by 
impoverishing communities and preventing them from harnessing the benefits from 
wildlife conservation (Hickey, 2015; Redpath et.al, 2013; Hübschle, 2016). This 
demonstrates a two-way causation process; where poaching can either contribute to 
poverty through the exploitation of resources, but simultaneously, poverty can add to 
the prevalence of poaching due to the lack of better economic alternatives to sustain 
livelihoods.   
 This issue linkage emphasizes the need for more research in this field on 
concrete bottom-up solutions to the socio-economic drivers. As research in this area is 
slowly growing, it is becoming evident that strategies that only address the security 
drivers cannot offer long-term sustainable solutions to poaching because they do not 
consider the vital role of livelihood development in poaching mitigation.  
 As part of bottom-up solutions, there is also a significant gap in academic 
literature regarding the role of women in conservation. Whether individuals are 
poachers or protectors, these roles are primarily occupied by men (Barbee, 2015; Bell 
2017). Notably, there has been no evidence that women are engaged in poaching for 
	 11	
ivory and rhino horn. The employment of women as rangers and their involvement in 
economic development opportunities, such as ecotourism and microenterprise, is vital 
for the success of bottom-up approaches (Reuter et.al, 2016; Roe, 2015; Duncker, 
2017). In addition, female participation would result in more boots on the ground 
engaging directly in species monitoring and protection (Barbee, 2015; Bell, 2017; 
Dubuis, 2017). Thus far, there has only been one project testing the role of women in 
conservation, namely the South African ‘Black Mamba’ conservation initiative 
(BMCI) (Reuter et.al, 2016). Despite being a stand-alone initiative, the project reports 
positive results in regards to female-driven species protection and community 
development (Reuter et.al, 2016). 
 It is research on socio-economic issues that address the root causes of 
poaching at community level rather than developing strategies on how to combat 
poaching once an individual has already made the decision to poach. The latter falls 
within the scope of top-down initiatives.  
 
(2) Top-down approaches 
 Top-down approaches are government-led solutions to conservation 
challenges. Research in this field suggests that there is a gap in literature, as research 
and policies regarding top-down strategies continuously fails to address both the 
socio-economic drivers of poaching at domestic level, and issue of cross-border 
movements at the international level (Hübschle, 2016; Poe, 2014). Rather, top-down 
driven solutions have predominately focused on the security challenges of poaching 
on a domestic scale whilst largely disregarding the various aspects that drive poaching 
due to socio-economic factors. Most likely, this has sparked researchers to shift their 
focus towards bottom-up solutions in order to better address the socio-economic 
drivers of poaching in rural communities.  
 This field of research is beginning to compile a greater understanding of how 
poaching is inter-connected to other large-scale developmental issues such as crime, 
corruption and state fragility, and the international spillover effects of these (Milliken, 
2014; Roe, 2015; Knapp, 2012). The literature likewise suggests that governments 
have to meet the increasing mobility and violence by poachers in order to protect both 
rural communities and species populations from threat and exploitation (Wall & 
McClanahan, 2015; Duffy, 2016; Douglas & Alie, 2014; Booker, 2017). Research on 
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top-down solutions has thus far primarily been concerned with the security aspects 
because this dimension of poaching mitigation requires solutions that are outside the 
capacity of community-level action.   
 Recent studies have begun to use the term ‘green militarization’, meaning the 
meshing of military tactics, forces, weaponry and technology with conservation 
initiatives (Lundstrum, 2014; Christy, 2015; Nelleman et.al, 2014). Research is also 
drawing connections between terrorist organizations, international crime and the ivory 
trade, referring to government-led anti-poaching initiatives as a type of conservation 
‘war’ (Wall & McClanahan, 2015; Lundstrum, 2014; Duffy 2016, Poe, 2014; Christy 
2015).  The escalation of violence is also due to the increasing clashes between 
rangers and poachers, which as a result fuels the need for government investment in 
armed forces, guns, vehicles, surveillance and training (Lundstrum, 2014; Nelleman 
et.al, 2014; Wall & McClanahan, 2015; Coons, 2015).  
 Furthermore, there is a significant gap in literature on the framework by which 
poaching is driven on an international scale. This highlights the strong need for 
intelligence gathering to create a clearer understanding of the terrorist groups 
involved and the mechanisms by which criminal syndicates are connected to one 
another, how the revenue from ivory and rhino horn flows, and who carries out the 
transactions (Vira et. al, 2014; Wall, & McClanahan, 2015). Solutions to combatting 
these large-scale transnational issues will require government driven solutions with 
international cooperation.   
 From here derives the relevance of this master’s thesis. It is clear that 
poaching is an escalating phenomenon that must be controlled – not only to protect 
the African elephant and rhino from extinction, but also to combat the developmental 
issues associated with poaching. However, the driving factors and the interlinking 
mechanisms by which the ivory trade is spurred and financed remains understudied 
and unclear. Even though it is not within the capacity of this study to establish a 
framework on the trade flows and relationships of the international actors and drivers 
of poaching, it aims to contribute to existing literature by providing a cost-benefit 
analysis of bottom-up and top-down solutions in relation to the socio-economic and 
security drivers of the poaching problem.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Assumptions of Rational Choice  
 Conservation activities are becoming increasingly more dangerous and 
militarized, primarily in response to the growing militarization of poachers and 
violent clashes between poachers and protectors. The risks of the industry are driving 
up the price of ivory and rhino horn, especially as demand from Asia continues to 
grow (National Geographic, 2015). Poachers are often hired from local communities 
by criminal networks, as locals best know how to navigate the territory and track 
elephant or rhino populations (Haas et.al, 2016). Despite the lucrative nature of the 
industry, it is the local poacher who receives the least revenue from their hunt as the 
bulk of income instead goes to the funding of criminal organizations, which puts both 
local and international communities at risk (Nellemann et.al, 2014).  
 This study will assume that people are rational actors driven largely by 
financial incentives. This assumption is supported by the theoretical lens of Rational 
Choice Theory. The theory is a framework for understanding economic behavior with 
the idea that each individual is a rational actor aiming to maximize his or her ‘utility’ 
or ‘happiness’. John et.al (2013) describe rational choice as: 
 
“When making decisions, people are influenced by the potential financial 
costs and benefits of a given course of action ... and by their understanding of 
how they are expected to behave within society. Rational Choice becomes a 
powerful predictive theory when it is combined with assumptions about 
preferences or with data on peoples observed choices” (John et.al, 2013: 345). 
 
 Although this study will not focus on Rational Choice Theory and its 
application, the theory is an important mechanism to justify the assumptions made 
regarding rational human behavior driven by financial gains. Hereforth, this study will 
refer to the aforementioned financially motivated assumption as simply ‘rational 
choice’.  By better understanding the influencing factors that drive people to either act 
as poachers or protectors, policies and conservation programs can be designed that 
optimize conservation activities in respect to the local economic and social conditions 
(Messer, 2017). 
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Theory of Change 
 For the purpose of this study, the term Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) refers to 
the illegal transnational trafficking of wildlife products, such as high valued ivory and 
rhino horn, rather than the customary use of wildlife for sustenance at community 
level.  
 Communities that live with wildlife are a key to combatting poaching due to 
their proximity and knowledge of the area. Their involvement and expertise aids in 
the reporting, detection and prevention of poaching activities. 
 There is a strong need for conservation strategies to identify the circumstances 
and mechanisms by which community participation can reduce IWT and poaching. 
However, the role of communities in combatting poaching and IWT and the 
conditions under which community involvement can and cannot succeed have 
received little attention. A guiding framework to assess and monitor such conditions 
is lacking, even though such a framework is essential to facilitate appropriate 
conservation strategies on the ground.  
 To address this theoretical gap, Biggs (2016) developed a Theory of Change 
(TOC) that explores the key enabling and disabling conditions for mechanisms to 
achieve the engagement of communities as actors in combatting poaching and IWT 
(Biggs et.al, 2016: 3). By providing a coherent and transparent framework, TOC is 
applied to community focused conservation initiatives that are driven by a mixture of 
different conditions under which community based conservation strategies are likely 
to succeed or fail (Biggs et.al, 2016: 4). 
 A TOC is: 
A decision support tool that helps illustrate the causal links and sequences of 
events needed for an activity to lead to a desired outcome or impact... TOC 
maps the missing link between what an activity does, what impact it has and 
how this leads to the desired outcomes (Biggs et.al, 2016: 3 & Center for 
Theory of Change, 2015).    
The TOC developed by Biggs (2016) defines four pathways for engaging 
communities. These include; the strengthening of disincentives for illegal poaching, 
increasing incentives for wildlife stewardship, decreasing the costs of living with 
wildlife and creating alternative livelihoods (Biggs et.al 2016: 5-6). In addition, there 
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are six conditions that play a role as enabling factors of these four pathways, namely: 
voice and accountability; political stability and absence of conflict or terrorism; 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption 
(Biggs et.al, 2016: 4).  
 The strengthening of disincentives of poaching is an important factor in 
response to IWT (Challender & MacMillan, 2014). The first pathway includes 
increasing the social stigma of poaching and strengthening law enforcement and 
penalties. Communities are key to the strengthening of disincentives for poaching by 
applying social sanctions against poachers, or, by employing them as game guards 
and scouts (Biggs et.al, 2016: 5). The second pathway of the TOC focuses on 
increasing incentives for stewardship of wildlife. The mechanisms in pathway two 
aim to support enterprise development that generates benefits from wildlife 
conservation (Biggs et.al, 2016: 6). This entails the development of eco-tourism 
enterprise and the training of locals to work as guides or in hospitality. The outcome 
of developing an industry that is dependent on wildlife is that communities will value 
wildlife more and have greater incentives to protect it (Biggs et.al, 2016: 6, Frost & 
Bond, 2008). Creating a sense of ownership and developing mechanisms by which 
communities can benefit from wildlife are considered by some scholars as key to 
community engagement in wildlife protection (Roe, 2015).   The third pathway in the 
TOC entails decreasing of costs of living with wildlife. Living in areas with great 
biodiversity can generate a variety of costs, especially when wildlife penetrates 
community land, raids crops and attacks people, fueling human-wildlife conflict 
(Biggs et.al, 2016: 7, Woodroffe et.al, 2007). According to the theory, decreasing the 
costs of living with wildlife is therefore a critical element to discourage communities 
from engaging in poaching (Biggs et.al, 2016: 7). Lastly, the fourth pathway 
highlights the necessity of creating alternative livelihoods. According to Biggs 
(2016), by creating alternative sources of income the need to poach is reduced (Biggs 
et.al, 2016: 8). This can be achieved through the development of small enterprise and 
micro-financing schemes (Roe et.al, 2015).  
 In the framework of this TOC, a few challenges need to be considered that can 
affect the outcomes of the pathways. Firstly, alternative income generating activities 
to poaching must be able to produce comparable levels of income for them to be 
attractive. Furthermore, when community members become active in law enforcement 
against poaching, their immediate personal safety comes under threat, especially 
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when confronted by armed poachers (Biggs et.al, 2016: 8). Biggs (2016) highlights 
that community relationships can breakdown, especially if there are some members 
working as eco-guards and rangers (who are then perceived as law enforcement 
agents rather than members of the community), whilst others are engaged in poaching 
(Biggs et.al, 2016:8). A final challenge is that if community based conservation 
initiatives prove successful and households begin to generate revenue from wildlife 
conservation, then this increases the risk of in-migration by outsiders who aim to 
share the benefits, thus leading to conflict or an increase in poaching as households 
seek additional income (Biggs et.al, 2016:7, Homewood et.al, 2004).  
 A downfall of the theory is that it does not consider the role of outsiders and 
the effect of poaching activities by criminal syndicates. It also does not consider the 
role of security related issues on conservation initiatives, such as state fragility or 
effect of conflict in neighboring countries.   
 The TOC will aid in the analysis of the case study findings, as it is a useful 
framework to determine whether enabling conditions for successful socio-
economically driven solutions are in place, and whether, through a particular 
intervention, a pathway is able to achieve appropriate solutions to poaching. The 
analysis section will refer back to this TOC in order to understand the causal links 
between the drivers of poaching and their respective top-down to bottom-up solutions.  
If the findings of the case studies follow the causal mechanisms as prescribed in the 
TOC pathways, then it can be assumed that the conservation initiative was successful. 
Furthermore, the sustainability of a case-study project can also be predicted using this 
theory when considering the aforementioned challenges that can affect the outcomes 
of the pathways. If the findings of the case studies demonstrate these challenges, then 
it can be assumed the project is unsustainable and more prone to failure.  
 	
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data Collection  
 This study will primarily use NGO and government produced and funded case 
studies on rhino and elephant conservation projects, news reports and features, 
academic literature and research that does not date before 2000, remaining within a 
timeframe of the last 17 years. By researching the link between poaching and 
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international crime as well as the economic and social challenges of bottom-up 
solutions, this thesis addresses a gap in academic literature and therefore has to rely 
on a variety of primary sources including reports, working papers, NGO case studies 
and publications, newspaper and magazine articles and press releases. The research 
will be conducted through data triangulation – by collecting and comparing data from 
multiple case studies and resources that have tested bottom-up and top-down 
strategies in nature conservatories specifically targeted at elephant and rhino 
conservation. The methodological challenge of this study lies in the assessment of the 
data and being able to find sufficient information that develops a comprehensive 
overview of the strengths and gaps in top-down and bottom-up conservation 
initiatives.  
 
Case Studies Overview   
 This study aims to analyze bottom-up and top-down driven solutions to 
poaching. The solution to reducing the numbers of animals being killed cannot be 
achieved solely though security focused government-led initiatives, but must also 
come from economic and social reforms at the community level with the aid of 
NGO’s or local government. This thesis aims to conduct a Small-N study, 
determining the relationship between the different kinds of variables in the cases that 
aid to achieve successful bottom-up or top-down solutions. The cases were selected 
according to the methodological approach of most similar systems design (MSSD), 
based on the various similarities between the cases. The countries that were chosen 
are all culturally close, have similar levels of economic development and have similar 
geography and biodiversity. The purpose of MSSD is to keep at a constant as many 
extraneous variables as possible when testing the effect of independent variables on 
the dependent variable (Bartolini, 1993). The benefit of choosing countries that have 
certain similarities is that contesting variables are kept constant so that explanatory 
factors cannot intervene in the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables (Przeworski & Teune, 1970: 76-85). However, according to Przeworski and 
Teune, the dependent variable is likely to be over-determined because it is impossible 
to find cases were all contesting variables can be kept at an exact constant 
(Przeworski & Teune, 1970: 76-85). 
 This study will use the cases of national parks in Namibia, Tanzania, South 
Africa and Kenya for its analysis (Cooney et.al, 2016; Roe, 2015; Mabele, 2016). 
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Detailed information on the cases, and the analysis of these, can be found in the 
following ‘cases and analysis’ sections. Notably, for the cases of Tanzania and Kenya 
there is a difference in level of cross-border security threat by criminal syndicates and 
terrorist organizations in comparison to a lower level of threat in the cases of South 
Africa and Namibia.  Kenya and Tanzania’s geographical proximity to some of the 
world’s least stable nations, including South Sudan, Sudan, The Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Somalia, create additional conservation challenges as transnational 
poaching activities flow between the porous borders (Christy, 2015). This key 
difference in level of security threat is used as an indicator to determine whether there 
is a relationship between a higher presence of transnational organized crime and 
poaching.  
  In all cases national parks, both socio-economic and security focused 
strategies are implemented as part of rhino and elephant conservation efforts. 
Poaching has been a major issue in all the parks with high and increasing levels of 
elephant and rhino killing for their commodities (Cooney et.al, 2016; Roe, 2015; 
Mabele, 2016).  Across all case studies, socio-economic, community driven strategies 
have been implemented. All cases also reported similarity in the challenges they faced 
regarding funding and timeframe. The types of socio-economic initiatives that were 
used across all cases include: economically centered methods such as revenue sharing 
from tourism; creation of conservation jobs for community members as rangers or eco 
guards; land leasing initiatives, which encourage community incentives to ensure 
wildlife protection by preventing poaching on their land; enterprise development and 
community resource management (Cooney et.al, 2016; Roe, 2015; Mabele, 2016, 
Duncker et.al, 2017).  Socially centered bottom-up methods included: adding a 
connotation of prestige to being an eco-guard or ranger; human – elephant conflict 
mitigation; community intelligence gathering; relationship building and integrated 
community support in law enforcement (Cooney et.al, 2016; Roe, 2015; Mabele, 
2016; Duncker et,al, 2017). Security centered strategies are the same for all cases 
which includes: the deployment of rangers, deployment of police or armed forces; use 
of weapons; presence of violence; use of violence, use of military grade surveillance 
technology such as GPS tracking and infrared; intelligence gathering, tracking and 
law enforcement activities (Cooney et.al, 2016; Roe, 2015; Mabele, 2016). 
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Variables 
 This master’s thesis aims to demonstrate that there is a strong need to develop 
initiatives that address the socio-economic challenges for conserving elephant and 
rhino populations to where they can be sustainable. For conservation efforts to be 
successful in reducing poaching, issues of economic and social development have to 
be addressed at a local level.  In addition, there is also an urgent need to protect 
species populations from external threats such as the criminal organizations that are 
dependent on the trade of ivory and rhino horn for revenue. This means that there are 
two sides to the coin; on one side socio-economic focused strategies address solutions 
through community development, whilst security focused approaches address the 
means by which to protect people and wildlife from highly organized and violent 
external actors. Socio-economic focused strategies alone will not protect elephant and 
rhino populations from militarized extremist organizations and the demand from the 
black market in Asia. 
 
Dependent variables:   
 Stability of elephant and rhino populations, CITES status of species 
 population.  
 
Independent variables: 
 Bottom-up solutions (community driven initiatives and poaching 
 interventions): Creation of micro-enterprise, development of (eco)tourism 
 industry, community participation in ecotourism industry, community 
 members becoming rangers, scouts or eco-guards, incentives of people to 
 protect wildlife, positive attitude towards wildlife, agriculture and land 
 management initiatives.  
 
 Top-down solutions (government driven initiatives and poaching 
 interventions): Deployment of rangers with weapons, use of military grade 
 technology, deployment of law enforcement and armed forces in anti-
 poaching activities, change in legislation, conviction of poachers, international 
 cooperation in anti-poaching initiatives, investment in domestic conservation 
 projects, development of wildlife tourism industry.  
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 Other variables to consider across case studies: Prevalence of corruption, 
cross-border crime flows and external pressures such as regional conflicts and 
refugees. 
 
Hypotheses  
  On the one hand, conservation strategies need to address the socio-economic 
factors that drive poaching incentives, calling for sustainable long-term solutions to 
the factors that push community members to becoming involved in poaching.  On the 
other hand, security focused approaches need to address solutions to poaching 
activities that are beyond the capabilities of local communities. This can include, for 
example, the deployment of armed forces in response to the increasing violence of 
poachers. Security approaches alone cannot induce the socio-economic change and 
engagement needed at community level to prevent people from poaching. In their 
search for income and sustenance, oftentimes individuals resort to poaching due to 
lack of alternatives. Especially individuals who struggle with issues of poverty fall 
victim to the lucrative promises made by criminal organizations that scout for 
poachers (Redpath et.al, 2013).  By introducing opportunities for economic 
development as part of conservation initiatives, alternative livelihoods to poaching 
can be created and the need to resort to poaching for income and sustenance reduced. 
Therefore:   
  
H1) Socio-economic approaches are more successful at reducing elephant and rhino 
poaching at community level than security-driven approaches. 
 
 Furthermore, in fragile states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Sudan, where instability is high, 
so is the rate of poaching by criminal syndicates. Elephants in Sudan have been 
completely eradicated, therefore now criminal organizations from Sudan, CAR and 
DRC go to poach in neighboring nations such as Kenya or Tanzania where relatively 
stable elephant populations remain due to successful conservation efforts (Christy, 
2015). It is important to consider whether there is a relationship between state 
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fragility and escalation of poaching in order to more fully address the security related 
issues of poaching and their possible solutions. Therefore:  
 
H2) Poaching driven by security factors requires different solutions to socio-
economically driven factors. 
 
Discussion of Limitations 
 This master’s thesis is an exploratory study and will attempt to answer the 
research question using a variety of publicly available data and resources, which may 
have an effect on the generalizability and utility of the findings of this research. 
Furthermore, this study will only focus on the development of conservation activities 
since 2005, as the selected case studies do not go beyond this timeframe. An 
additional limitation to this research is the time in which it is conducted due to the 
fact that there is a significant gap in literature on the successful implementation of 
community driven solutions to poaching, as these are still being tested and studied. 
 The time allocation of this study does not allow for fieldwork to research the 
hypotheses to a greater extent, which in the future may serve as starting-point for a 
continuation of the findings of this paper. It is also important to note that there is no 
economic theory that specifically connects poaching to poverty other than to some 
extent the TOC and Rational Choice Theory and the assumption that people are 
rational actors driven by financial incentives.  
  Finally, often money spent on conservation activities gets bundled 
together into broader categories such as law enforcement, armed forces, training, 
infrastructure, etc. Therefore there is no accurate picture of the expenditures that go 
into anti-poaching efforts. As such no clear comparison can be drawn on which 
strategy may be more cost effective.   
 
CASES  
 The following section will provide a detailed description of each case study 
separately. The tables offer a brief overview of each country’s profile according to 
conservation initiative and highlight the species, species stability, type of poachers 
and opportunities that were created through top-down and bottom-up conservation 
approaches. For the purpose of this study, success of conservation initiative is 
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measured by whether the species is on the IUCN (International Union for 
Conservation of Nature) CITES (Convention on International Trade of Endangered 
Species) Appendix I or Appendix II. Species that are listed on CITES Appendix I are 
the most critically endangered, whereas species listed on Appendix II are endangered 
but not under threat of extinction (CITES Appendices, 2013). Species can be listed on 
Appendix I, yet their population in a given area can be stable – there is an absence of 
a population decline. However, this does not account for a healthy species population 
but rather means that there is a species population that is critically endangered, even 
though numbers are not declining at the moment of measurement. Species on 
Appendix II with a stable status represent healthier populations that are not critically 
threated by extinction. Species can move between appendixes according to their 
population health.  
 Additionally, external security or terror threat is defined by the presence of 
cross border movements by militias and criminal syndicates who carry out poaching 
activities. These groups move to poach outside their home countries, predominantly 
coming from The Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Sudan and Chad (Christy, 2015). Due to high levels of poaching and 
dwindling elephant and rhino populations in these nations, poachers venture into 
countries where conservation activities have been relatively successful (Schiffman, 
2014). Species populations in Kenya and Tanzania are under increased pressure from 
external threats as poacher-terrorists enter national parks through porous and poorly 
managed borders (Christy, 2015).  
 
Country Profiles  
 The following section will provide a general country overview in the form of a 
table, followed by a detailed description of each case study. The case studies represent 
conservation initiatives that are governed by the use of both top-down and bottom-up 
strategies. The case studies demonstrate the initiatives that were taken to curb 
poaching activities and conserve elephant and rhino populations. In the section 
‘outcomes and challenges’, information on the effects and successes or failures of the 
implemented conservation strategies will be provided on a country and case-by-case 
basis.  
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K E N Y A 
Table 1. 
Location KENYA 
Focus Species  African Elephant and Black Rhino 
CITES Status 
Elephant 
Rhino 
High Risk from Poaching  
Appendix I 
Appendix I 
Elephant Stability Stable  
Rhino Stability Stable  
Poachers Members of local or neighboring 
communities, locals hired by outsiders. 
Opportunities Creation on conservation jobs, eco-
tourism, enterprise development, 
community resource management, land-
lease payments based on community 
performance in conservation.  
External Security and Terror Threats Yes 
 
SITE(S)  
 The case of Kenya includes two major areas of study, which are represented 
by the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) conservancies and the Olderkesi Wildlife 
Conservancy (OWC).  
 
Northern Rangelands Trust:  
 The NRT conducts conservation management projects, made up of 19 
community run conservancies which cover 2.5 million hectares of community land in 
Kenya (King & Craig, 2015). Conservancies are well-governed, community owned 
areas with the goal of improving socio-economic conditions, land management and 
wildlife conservation strategies. Communities own the land, either through legal or 
traditional mechanisms and work together to ensure conservation of species on their 
territories.  
 The success of these conservancies is related to the broader benefits they bring 
to local communities. Poverty levels among communities are generally high with 
more than 70% of the population living below the national poverty line (King & 
Craig, 2015).  In this respect, conservancies offer alternative livelihoods to 
communities other than farming and livestock grazing, generating both financial and 
non-financial benefits (Pye-Smith, 2013). In 2013, conservancies generated 700 full-
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time and 800 part-time jobs in conservation activities, including microenterprise and 
tourism operations (King & Craig, 2015).  Allocation of revenues was managed by 
community members to increase notions of ownership and responsibility. Non-
financial benefits included better levels of security from external threats and militias, 
which was considered more important by some communities than financial gains 
(King & Craig, 2015).   
According to NRT, tackling elephant and rhino poaching requires a multi-faceted 
approach. This includes the engagement of community members as rangers, creation 
of rapid response teams to instances of poaching or security threats to villages, 
intelligence gathering and social pressure on communities to engage in protection 
activities (Pye-Smith, 2013). On daily patrols, a network of around 400 community 
rangers monitors wildlife across all conservancy areas who are in direct contact with 
Kenyan law enforcement authorities. However, just over one third are armed and 
these operate under the Kenyan Police forces (King & Craig, 2015).  In addition, there 
are three armed rapid response teams made up of 25 rangers from communities in the 
conservancies. Rangers are specially trained and armed multi-ethnic groups who are 
granted jurisdiction to move between tribal territories, thus being able to operate 
where traditional law enforcement would not have access (King & Craig, 2015).  A 
local informant network complements the conservancies intelligence services, 
engaging community members in the protection of populations and reporting of 
crime. NRT projects found that although there are significant risks involved in the 
anti-poaching activities at ground level, community members reported that the 
benefits of wildlife protection outweigh the dangers of engaging in the protection of 
species (Roe, 2015). Kenya has legally recognized the role of conservancies through 
the 2013 Wildlife Conservation and Management Act (WWF, 2014). This includes 
their role in the tackling of wildlife crime, managing inter-tribal conflict and tackling 
banditry.   
 
Olderkesi Wildlife Conservancy: 
 The OWC is an important wildlife corridor between the Loita and Ngurman 
hills and the Maasai Mara National Reserve (Roe, 2015). All wildlife in OWC is 
under threat by poaching activities and changing patterns of commercial use of land. 
Increasing demand for land for farming livestock is adding tension to wildlife – 
human conflict dynamics.  
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 The conservation program is based on incentive payments to local 
communities that aim to ensure wildlife protection from poachers within their areas 
and to manage and prevent clashes between farming activities and wildlife. The 
program is based on a mechanism of lease payments that are competitive with the 
revenues from alternative domestic land use such as agriculture and livestock grazing 
(Cottar, 2015). Payments are made directly to community elders to mitigate 
corruption. Violations of agreements regarding land use, such as poaching, results in a 
reduction of lease payments to community leaders who are then held accountable for 
making up the deficit (Cottar, 2015; Roe, 2015).  In instances where payments are 
reduced due to violations of agreements it is up to the community leaders to punish 
the culprits (if these are community members or locals in the area). The nature of this 
scheme is that is promotes collective accountability and responsibility for wildlife 
protection and sustainable land management.  
Additionally, the conservancy also coordinated a team of local scouts and rangers that 
operate as undercover units, liaising with other rangers and community members to 
collect evidence in instances of poaching (Cottar, 2015).  When community members 
cooperate with rangers and scouts who are investigating wildlife crime, payments are 
contributed towards their lease payments, fostering incentives to cooperate with 
wildlife services.  
The sustainability of this initiative is dependent on its economic benefits and whether 
the community maintains that land for wildlife conservation is worth the risks of 
protecting it (Cottar, 2015). While the level of financial security for communities in 
conservancies is generally better, it remains vulnerable to external factors such as 
domestic prices of commodities like wheat and maize. If the prices for these goods 
rise, the returns from land leasing for wildlife may not suffice in the future.  
As part of its crackdown on wildlife crime in the area, Kenyan authorities have raised 
fines and penalties for perpetrators whilst increasing rewards for informers (Cottar, 
2015).  Simultaneously, ivory poachers have reportedly become more ruthless and 
violent (Cottar, 2015; Roe, 2015).  Although poachers were once welcomed by 
villagers, their tactics now include turning villages against them through threats and 
acts of violence against both people and property (Cottar, 2015; Roe, 2015).   This 
fosters fear for security and loss of livelihood and can push community members to 
not cooperate with authorities or report crimes of poaching.  
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T A N Z A N I A 
Table 2. 
 
SITE(S) 
 
Ruvuma Elephant Project: 
 The Ruvuma Elephant Project (REP) covers two conservation areas in 
Tanzania: the Sealous Game Reserve in the South of Tanzania and the Niassa 
National Reserve, which shares national boundaries with Mozambique. The Sealous-
Niassa wildlife corridor is one of the most notorious areas for elephant poaching in 
Africa (Roe, 2015). Conservation strategies involve community participation 
programs and intelligence sharing.  
 The REP focuses its initiatives on close community collaboration to achieve a 
mechanism of reciprocal support and participation. This includes joint patrols and 
operations by both rangers and community members and intelligence gathering 
activities. 
 The Sealous-Niassa wildlife corridor falls within multiple administrative 
zones within three local government districts and five wildlife management areas 
which are community-based organizations that have legal authorization to protect and 
manage resources in a sustainable manner (Swai & Lotter, 2015).   
 The aim of the REP is to establish a reliable overview of elephant populations 
and threats in the area, and to better understand population migration patters, control 
Location TANZANIA 
Focus Species  African Elephant and Black Rhino  
CITES Status 
 
Elephant 
Rhino 
Extremely high and increasing levels of 
poaching 
Appendix I 
Appendix I 
Elephant Stability Rapidly Decreasing  
Rhino Stability Stable / Decreasing 
Poachers Locals financed by outsiders 
Opportunities Community intelligence gathering, 
participation and rangers and eco-guards, 
enterprise development and wildlife-
human conflict mitigation programs 
External Security Threats Yes 
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poaching and to ensure law enforcement is a functioning deterrent mechanism (Swai 
& Lotter, 2015).  The overall goal is to reduce elephant and rhino mortality rates 
caused by human-elephant conflict and interaction. To enhance species protection and 
community participation, REP has facilitated the training and education of 
community-based scouts and rangers with skills in case reporting and poaching 
prevention. Through air surveillance and geographical positioning system (GPS), REP 
collected data on elephant populations, number of carcasses and poaching activity. 
Additionally, the project established cooperation incentives by giving financial 
rewards for compliance and the delivery of information (Swai & Lotter, 2015).   
Through financial rewards the REP also supports individuals seeking to obtain 
alternative livelihoods and income generating activities that contribute towards the 
wellbeing of communities in the conservancies (Swai & Lotter, 2015).  The REP 
initiative actively facilitates community engagement in conservation projects and 
through this participation the project also aims to change human attitude and behavior 
towards wildlife as locals recognize the importance of healthy species populations for 
the sustainability of the ecosystem and their livelihoods (Swai & Lotter, 2015).   
 However, the involvement of community members is not without risks. The 
REP reported that due to increasing violence by poachers community guards have 
been shot or their homes destroyed (Roe, 2015) In order to ensure that community 
members remain committed to species protection, REP offers financial compensation 
to rebuild morale. REP reports that through rapid response mechanisms to times of 
crisis, overall commitment levels remained high as the rewards outweighed the risks 
of protection (Swai & Lotter, 2015).   
 Despite resurgence of ivory and rhino horn poaching in the Sealous-Niassa 
corridor, REP reported that in general elephant poaching has been manageable in the 
area and anti-poaching strategies successful at keeping species populations relatively 
stable (Swai & Lotter, 2015). However, should the pressure and violence from 
external actors increase, this stability may become jeopardized in the future.  
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S O U T H  A F R I C A 
Table 3.  
Location SOUTH AFRICA 
Focus Species  African Elephant and Black Rhino  
CITES Status 
 
Elephant  
Rhino 
Increasing risk of poaching from 
outsiders. 
Appendix II 
Appendix II 
Elephant Stability Stable  
Rhino Stability Stable  
Poachers Poachers are mainly externally hired 
outsiders and middlemen. 
Opportunities Revenue and income from eco-tourism, 
enterprise opportunity, jobs as rangers 
and eco-guards, development of 
alternative livelihoods, development of 
infrastructure as incentive to participate 
in conservation initiatives.  
External Security Threats No 
 
SITE(S) 
 
Black Mamba Conservation Initiative: 
 The Black Mamba Conservation Initiative (BMCI) operates in the Balule 
Private Nature Reserve and Greater Kruger Conservation Area. The project operates 
under three main components including; teams of two that conduct anti-poaching 
operations, a teams of 23 armed rangers that track species populations and respond to 
crisis, and lastly, environmental monitors which consist of a team of 26 unarmed 
intelligence gatherers (Reuter et.al, 2016). The BMCI employs a team of 
environmental monitors as part of its anti-poaching strategy that is made up of a team 
of women who act as observers, conduct road blocks and vehicle checks, undertake 
patrols and gather intelligence from their communities (Reuter et.al, 2016).  They also 
act as teachers, educating their communities on the importance of wildlife 
conservation. These women are called the Black Mambas and support the rangers and 
armed response teams by providing intelligence on poaching and incursion.   
 The main objective of the initiative is to protect wildlife through local 
community engagement. The initiative aims to create bonds between communities 
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and wildlife. All Black Mambas are recruited from local disadvantaged communities 
and are put through a six-week training program prior to the start of their fieldwork 
(Reuter et.al, 2016). The program addresses social needs in communities and aims to 
determine how alternative livelihoods can be created through conservation initiatives. 
Through its activities, BMCI aims to address unemployment in South Africa and 
assist with skills development and education (Reuter et.al, 2016). Black Mambas are 
also employed around schools in their communities to raise awareness and provide a 
better understanding of the importance of wildlife for the next generation. 
 Financial benefits are provided to those employed in anti-poaching efforts. 
Non-financial benefits include personal care items, training and certification, food 
rations, and media visibility.  
 
Makuleke Eco-tourism Project: 
 The Makuleke Initiative is located in the Pafuri Camp (PC) in the northern 
region of South Africa’s Kruger National Park. PC is a community driven ecotourism 
project that aims to protect the wildlife in the region from poaching and sustain a 
competitive ecotourism enterprise that helps to provide communities with alternative 
livelihoods and sustainable income opportunities (UNDP, 2012).   
 The strategies of the project are centered around community participation 
initiatives under the notion that community-based engagement is the most effective 
mechanism for wildlife protection and sustainable development (UNDP, 2012).  PC 
activities aim to generate income through sustainable environmental use, and to raise 
awareness among the local population about the importance of protecting species and 
biodiversity. Additionally, anti-poaching units have been established to identify and 
combat poaching activity for ivory and rhino horn.   
 The project is based on communally owned land and managed through a 
three-way partnership between local Makuleke landowners, private enterprise such as 
Safari companies and the State (Roe, 2015; UNDP, 2012).   Ecotourism revenues are 
an important source of income for funding wildlife protection initiatives. The project 
is the largest employer of residents in the Makuleke area with 90% of the community 
working in PC ecotourism projects (UNDP, 2012). Furthermore, a revenue sharing 
agreement as been negotiated as part of a partnership between the Makuleke 
community and Safari organizations, which are to pay 8% of revenues from lodging 
to the community on whose land they stand (UNDP, 2012). These revenues in return 
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help fun community development projects such as independent agribusiness or 
hospitality initiatives run by locals, such as bed and breakfasts. The generation of 
revenue helps locals to maintain sustainable alternative livelihoods in the ecotourism 
sector. Makuleke community members also participate directly in wildlife protection 
initiatives through their employment as eco-guards and rangers. To further 
participation incentive, the PC project funds and assists the development of 
infrastructure such as healthcare and education facilities (UNDP, 2012).  
 
N A M I B I A 
Table 4.  
Location NAMIBIA 
Focus Species  African Elephant and Black Rhino  
CITES Status 
Elephant 
Rhino 
Risk of poaching from outsiders. 
Appendix II 
Appendix II 
Elephant Stability Stable 
Rhino Stability  Stable and Increasing 
Poachers Poachers are mainly externally hired 
outsiders and middlemen. 
Opportunities Revenue and income from eco-tourism, 
enterprise opportunity, jobs as rangers 
and eco-guards, social prestigious 
connotation of being ranger, community 
based responsibility and management.  
External Security Threats No 
 
SITE(S) 
  
Rhino Custodianship Program (RCP): 
 The RCP is an initiative based in 13 communal conservancies in Namibia 
(Muntifering et.al, 2015). The RCP is a state-established program on community 
managed land, spearheaded by Namibia’s Ministry of Environment and Tourism. The 
project aims to achieve rural development goals with the management of biodiversity 
through the restoration of black rhino populations. The project is driven by demand 
from local communities to establish rhino-tourism initiatives. The RCP program 
offers opportunities to enhance local values and institutions that support species 
conservation by finding common interests between communities and government. 
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This includes; the management of tourism on communal land to conserve and utilize 
rhino populations for tourism, granting of custodial rights to land owners by 
government, granting rights to local people to benefit from the non-consumptive use 
of rhino without the requirement of sharing revenues with government, and enhancing 
local conservation activities through assigning joint responsibility for the protection 
of rhinos (Muntifering et.al, 2015). Tourism organizations also play a role in 
conservation by providing financial means for monitoring rhino populations. 
Additionally, rangers who have been appointed by communities are provided with 
training, field gear and monitoring equipment. They receive performance-based 
incentive payments to enhance the quality and quantity of their work (Muntifering 
et.al, 2015). 
 The project highlights the importance of recognizing the rights of locals to 
manage and benefit from wildlife and to help these build the capacity to do so, 
thereby creating alternative livelihoods. Local communities must function as critical 
partners in conservation efforts.  
 
The Rhino Rangers Incentive Program (RRIP):  
 The RRIP is a community driven initiative that was created through 
communities demand to enhance rhino protection mechanisms in response to an 
escalating threat from poachers. Communities in Namibia North-West regions acted 
as a catalyst for capacity building initiatives to protect the black rhino. Community 
leaders asked the Ministry of Environment and Tourism and Rhino Custodians 
Program to assist in rhino monitoring and protection, thus creating the RRIP (Hambo 
et.al, 2015) 
 The initiative focuses on the improvement of species population monitoring 
by creating joint patrols with rhino specialists, skills training and job creation by 
employing locals and rangers or scouts. Further incentives include the donation of 
equipment and resources to communities, as well as performance-based financial 
bonuses (Hambo et.al, 2015).   
 The RRIP aims to increase rhino population stability by strengthening tourism 
regulations as well as increasing the number of ‘boots on the ground’ in rhino 
populated areas. In the region, poaching is on the rise by outside recruited middlemen 
(Hambo et.al, 2015).  The project additionally works towards reducing local tolerance 
to poaching by enhancing human-wildlife relationships and educating locals in the 
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importance of biodiversity. The training of community members in conservation 
strategies also involves recording and reporting criminal and suspicious behavior to 
official capacities. By enhancing the relationship between officials and locals the 
ability and motivation of communities to detect and report poaching activities should 
be increased (Hambo et.al, 2015).   RRIP operates through the concept that a stable 
wildlife population depends on the local communities level of tolerance regarding 
poaching, and the locals accepting and understanding that rhinos are of greater value 
alive rather than dead. The project creates new revenue generating opportunities 
through rhino tourism to help increase their value to community members and thereby 
strengthen the importance of conserving them. 
 
OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS 
 In all case studies, anti-poaching strategies aim to address a multifaceted and 
complex issue with no one-fits-all solution. The findings of this study suggest that 
solutions to combatting poaching activities are two-sided. On one hand, there are 
socio-economic issues, such as poverty and lack of alternative livelihoods that drive 
poaching incentives at community level. On the other hand, security threats and 
illegal activity by criminal syndicates, as well as domestic economic instability, are 
factors requiring government driven actions and solutions. These findings suggest that 
poaching must be addressed at each level, treated as both separate and interlinking 
issues in order to maximize the effectiveness of each approach. Although this study 
does not address solutions to the demand side influences from Asia, the high prices 
for the commodity must be considered as perpetuating mechanisms for driving the 
illegal activity - especially as ivory and rhino horn represents a form of ‘bush 
currency’ for criminal syndicates (Duffy, 2016).   
 Due to the security and socio-economic dimensions of poaching, the following 
section will provide and overview of the outcomes and challenges of the case studies. 
This section will also provide a cost-benefit overview and analysis of bottom-up and 
top-down solutions through a domestic and international context.  
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K E N Y A 
Table 5.  
Policies                   Outcomes                   Challenges  
• Better 
monitoring 
by rangers 
• Increased 
investment in 
conservatory 
initiatives. 
• Multi-ethnic 
surveillance 
groups 
 
• Success in reducing 
poaching within 
conservancy. 
• Decrease in human-wildlife 
conflict.  
• Increased range of patrols. 
• Improved security.  
• Increase in community 
incentive to protect wildlife.  
• Downturn in tourism 
affects success.  
• Financial sustainability 
requires minimum 10-year 
investment commitment.  
• External poaching on the 
rise. 
• Corruption impedes 
prosecution. 
 
Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) and Olderkesi Wildlife Conservatory (OWC): 
 The approach for successfully tackling poaching is multi-faceted; including 
intelligence gathering, social pressure, land-leasing initiatives, employing community 
members as rangers and the deployment of rapid response teams to instances of 
poaching.  
 The NRT employs a mixture of both socio-economic and security focused 
approaches, with a network of 400 community rangers monitoring elephant and rhino 
populations on daily patrols (King & Craig, 2015). All of these are in direct 
communication with government authorities and national law enforcement. Only a 
third of rangers are armed and those who do carry weapons operate under the Kenyan 
police rather than through the jurisdiction of community elders (King & Craig, 2015). 
In addition, teams of rangers made up of multi-ethnic groups who are granted special 
jurisdiction to move between different communal territories, thus operating in areas 
government-employed law enforcement could not. This strategic synergy between 
communities and authorities proved as a highly effective mechanism for species 
populations monitoring and protecting (King & Craig, 2015). As the NRT 
conservatories grew and community engagement demonstrated effectiveness, 
government incentives to invest in making intelligence gathering more formal and 
strategic increased as well (King & Craig, 2015). The NRT reported that an additional 
benefit of community-led conservation programs is their role changing social norms 
and applying social pressure to expose or shame poachers, including customary 
punishments such as banishing or cursing individuals – actions that still carry weight 
in traditional communities (King & Craig, 2015).    
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 Despite the risks of engaging in species conservation and protection from 
poachers, community members in both NRT and Olderkesi conservancies reported 
that the benefits of protecting wildlife nevertheless outweighed the dangers (King & 
Craig, 2015; Cottar, 2015).  The growing success of conservancies has increased 
government appreciation and recognition, leading to conservancies of the NRT 
gaining a legal foundation for their role through the 2013 Wildlife Conservation 
Management Act (King & Craig, 2015). The Act protects conservancies’ rights to 
manage the tackling of illegal trade, poaching, inter-tribal conflict and banditry. 
 Both the NRT and Olderkesi reported that the successes of initiatives are 
encouraging even though the dynamics of conservation strategies have changed since 
2010 due to an increase in the price for ivory and transnational poaching activities 
(King & Craig 2015; Cottar, 2015).  Most NRT conservancies that were implemented 
between 2001 and 2011 reported a reduction in poaching, backed up by evidence that 
includes aerial survey data on species populations and carcass data. The findings 
suggest that there was an increase in elephant populations by 27% between 2002 and 
2008, where the animals that were being killed in Kenya was significantly lower 
inside conservancies that outside their jurisdiction (King & Craig, 2015).  In the 
period between 2009 and 2012, ranger-led species monitoring reported that there was 
an increase in poaching activity, with the number of elephant carcasses found due to 
poaching rising from 34% to 81%, and the overall population declining by 14% in 
that same time period (King & Craig, 2015). Despite the overall decline, species 
populations remain stable on conservancy land to date, even though conservancies 
were unable to fully contain a dramatic rise in poaching levels between 2011 and 
2015 (King & Craig, 2015; Cottar, 2015). In response, government authorities 
strengthened their support for conservancies through the employment of police, 
support of wildlife services and increased investment.  
 Olderkesi and the NRT reported that community conservancies proved to be 
effective and respected mechanisms for conservation and maintaining alternative 
livelihoods as long as the nature of their governance remained inclusive and in the 
governance of the community (King & Craig, 2015; Cottar, 2015). Successful 
conservancies should not exclude locals from land use, nor should boundaries 
between wildlife and community members be created (Cottar, 2015). Working 
towards a common cause enforces incentive to participate in conservation and ensure 
the anticipated outcome is sustained.  
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 Additional findings through conservancy initiatives highlight the importance 
of ownership, suggesting that the local communities who own the land must be the 
main entities in decision making processes, with NGO’s and governments only acting 
as supportive partners. Strong community ownership is important for the projects to 
be self-sustaining, especially at times of poor governance (Cottar, 2015). Notably, 
non-financial incentives must also be considered as a valuable tool for success; such 
as the social prestige of acting as a ranger or the value of elephants and rhinos as 
cultural heritage. In respect to changing perspectives and incentives, social pressure is 
one of the strongest factors that influences mindsets within communities according to 
NRT findings (King & Craig, 2015).   Kenya’s crackdown on poaching and wildlife 
crime has resulted in the dramatic increase of fines and penalties for illegal behavior, 
paired with financial incentives and rewards for informers (Cottar, 2015). 
Simultaneously, ivory and rhino horn poachers have become more ruthless and 
violent (Cottar, 2015). These factors cannot be addressed and combatted by 
communities alone, but require government response through the deployment of 
armed forces.  
 
T A N Z A N I A   
Table 6.  
Policies                   Outcomes                   Challenges  
• Better 
monitoring by 
rangers.  
• Heightened law 
enforcement. 
• Employing 
locals as guards 
and informers.  
• Integrated 
community and 
law 
enforcement 
protection.  
• Multiple 
agency 
governance.  
• Increased transparency 
hindering corruption. 
• Increase in incentives to 
participate in protection. 
• Drop in species carcasses 
related to poaching.  
• Change in social perceptions 
towards poaching.  
• Drop in poaching related 
elephant deaths.  
• Porous long border. 
• Increase in poaching 
violence. 
• Increase in use of 
weaponry by poachers. 
• Funding constraints 
 
The Ruvuma Elephant Project (REP): 
 The REP is built on initiatives of community engagement as a tactic to combat 
poaching for ivory and rhino horn. Community engagement is fostered through 
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employing local people as informers and guards. Through community engagement 
and the strengthening of values regarding wildlife, the project also worked to change 
social perceptions towards conservation. Locals receive financial rewards for 
delivering information and for carrying out tasks. Additionally, the REP aids locals 
with crop protection and the sale of chili peppers, which are used for crop protection 
from wildlife. They also receive financial rewards for good performance in law 
enforcement activities.   
 Due to the increasing violence of poachers, conservation work is not without 
risks. Community guards have been shot or their homes destroyed and raided (Swai & 
Lotter, 2015). The REP reports that in order to maintain incentive and morale for 
wildlife protection engagement, conservation initiatives must be quick to provide 
compensation (Swai & Lotter, 2015; Roe, 2015).   Furthermore, the REP case study 
found that the rewards outweigh the risks, as locals remained committed to the 
project, with an increasing amount of people wanting to join conservation and 
protection activities (Swai & Lotter, 2015).    
 The REP conducts ground patrols and aerial surveillance missions to monitor 
species populations. Since the beginning of the project in 2012, elephant carcass 
sightings suggest a substantial drop in poaching activities inside the REP protected 
area, where 216 were sighted in 2012 compared to 68 in 2014 (Swai & Lotter, 2015).   
However, despite the decline of elephant carcasses within the REP conservancy, 
elephant populations are declining in Tanzania overall (Swai & Lotter, 2015; Roe, 
2015).   This not only reflects the effectiveness of conservancies, but simultaneously 
suggests that although conservancies can be successful mechanisms of species 
protection, there are not enough initiatives similar to REP in place to conserve 
elephant populations in areas of Tanzania that remain unmonitored and unprotected.  
 Since the start of REP, interventions have resulted in the seizure of 1,582 
snares, 25,586 pieces of illegal timber, 175 elephant tusks, 805 firearms, 1,531 rounds 
of ammunition, 6 vehicles and 15 motorbikes - with law enforcement activities 
resulting in the arrest of 562 people (Swai & Lotter, 2015). Success of the REP is 
reportedly attributed to the high levels of community engagement with the integrated 
support of formal law enforcement (Swai & Lotter, 2015).  The REP study suggests 
that local involvement in poaching activities is due to a manifestation of other issues, 
including: lack of purpose, absence of alternatives, lack of understanding of 
importance of conservation and lack of good relationships between authorities and 
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communities (Swai & Lotter, 2015). In order to ensure the long-term success of 
conservation initiatives, it is important to address these factors and recognize them as 
causes for conservation failures.  
 Finally, the findings of the REP stipulate that the project functions with 
positive results thanks to the mechanisms by which it is governed. The conservancy 
area is protected by multiple agencies rather than through a single authority. These 
include; communities and organizations working with communities, non-
governmental organizations (NGO’s) with special focus on protected area 
management, and government authorities (Swai & Lotter, 2015). The benefit of 
multiple agency involvement is that it hinders corruption by increasing the 
transparency of investments and financial flows (Swai & Lotter, 2015; Roe, 2015).    
 
S O U T H  A F R I C A 
Table 7.  
Policies                   Outcomes                    Challenges  
• Alternative 
livelihood 
development.  
• Engagement of 
women in anti-
poaching 
strategies. 
• Collaboration 
between armed 
forces and 
communities. 
• Eco-tourism 
enterprise 
development.  
•  Decrease in poaching. 
• Increase in wildlife 
populations. 
• Increase in engagement of 
locals in conservation.  
• Destruction of 12 poachers 
camps. 
• Increase in investments 
into community 
development. 
• Micro-businesses operating 
at profit.   
• Heavily reliant on donor 
funding. 
• Downturn in tourism 
affects success.  
• Protecting rangers and 
protectors from 
poachers.  
 
Black Mamba Conservation Initiative (BMCI) and Makuleke Ecotourism Project 
(MEP): 
 The BMCI is based on a community engagement approach that strives to 
increase species protection from poachers and illegal hunting practices. The success 
of the initiative derives from the creation of alternative livelihoods by providing 
women a means of income and access to fieldwork. The benefit of their experiences is 
that women traditionally maintain close relations between family members, therefore 
their knowledge transcends into their family and community circles, multiplying 
environmental awareness to the communities around them (Reuter et.al, 2016).  The 
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Black Mambas act as observers and reporters, collecting evidence of intrusion, 
detecting traps and detecting and exposing poacher camps and activities (Reuter et.al, 
2016). Their findings are crucial to the armed response teams who follow up on their 
reports. Their collaboration with armed forces represents a well-functioning 
mechanism that engages people at both community and governmental levels.  
 The success of the BMCI is reportedly also due to its multi-stakeholder 
inclusion (Reuter et.al, 2016).  The project is led in collaboration with government 
entities such as armed anti-poaching units and the Ministry of Tourism and 
Environment, tourism organizations and lodge owners, private landowners and 
NGO’s (Reuter et.al, 2016).  Similarly, the MEP’s accomplishments are dependent on 
multi-stakeholder partnerships between community landowners, private tourism 
enterprises and the government authorities of Kruger National Park (UNDP, 2012).    
 Multi-stakeholder involvement aids in the reduction of corruption by creating 
transparency, and ensures distribution of responsibility where differentiating issues 
are dealt with by experts at every level. This implies that security aspects are handled 
by government forces or security companies with expertise on security matters, 
whereas socio-economic challenges are dealt with by tourism agencies to create jobs, 
or NGO’s that aid in livelihood development and skills training.  
 The challenge in the BMCI is that it is a stand-alone initiative, making its 
application difficult to other contexts as there is no ‘one-fits-all solution to poaching 
 (Reuter et.al, 2016). The focus of this program has been on empowering women 
through the Black Mamba project, and analyzing the consequences of their 
involvement in conservation activities. In communities where women may have a 
different social-status than in South Africa, for example, where it is traditionally not 
accepted for women to work outside the home, applying a similar project can prove 
difficult.  
 In the timeframe between 2013 and 2015, the Black Mambas have reduced 
wildlife-poisoning activities by 76% and, with the aid of armed forces, destroyed 12 
poachers camps within the area of their jurisdiction (Reuter et.al, 2016).   
 For the MEP, revenue from tourism is a vital source of funding and an 
important mechanism to maintain alternative livelihoods (UNDP, 2012). The long-
term sustainability of the project is dependent on a variety of community-centered 
factors, including employment and training opportunities, grants for education and 
vocational training and loans for enterprise development. From a government-level, 
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investments into community infrastructure, such as the development of social 
services, schools, clinics and sanitation facilities all aid in community cohesion and 
the creation of social capital - thus decreasing the need to resort to poaching and 
wildlife trade as a source of income. The findings of the MEP or similar initiatives 
entail that benefits from development opportunities must flow directly back to the 
community in order to sustain alternative livelihoods and to maintain incentives to 
protect wildlife.  
 The MEP fosters and helps build relationships between community members 
and government authorities – a mechanism that is crucial for effective anti poaching 
strategies (UNDP, 2012). Evidence from MEP findings suggest that the communities 
must recognize the government as a viable partner to their development and success. 
Likewise, it is important that government authorities that aim to conserve and protect 
wildlife in their area recognize the vital role of communities for the success of such 
initiatives.  
 The MEP supports its projects by providing financial benefits through 
ecotourism. The project reported that since the implementation of the initiative in 
2005, revenues from alternative livelihoods have been on the rise and investments 
into the community increased (UNDP, 2012). Micro-business initiatives have 
exceeded the break-even point and are operating at a profit since 2008 (UNDP, 2012).   
However, the MEP’s capacity to sustain, enhance and expand benefits of conservation 
depends largely on the commercial success of the ecotourism operations (UNDP, 
2012). This consequently stipulates that businesses that are dependent on ecotourism 
will struggle at times when tourism is low in the area, which will result in land and 
business owners seeking other alternatives for income, like resorting to poaching 
activities for sustenance.  
N A M I B I A 
Table 8.  
Policies                   Outcomes                    Challenges  
• Creation of jobs and 
alternative livelihoods. 
• Skills development. 
• Strengthening tourism 
regulations. 
• Boosting of numbers of 
rangers and eco-guards.  
• Introduction of rhino 
profile cards.  
• Stronger human-wildlife 
bonds.  
• Increased interest in 
participation to protect 
wildlife. 
• Increase in rhino populations. 
• Increase in rhino tourism.  
• Increased opportunities for 
private enterprise 
development.  
• Superstition and belief in 
witchcraft can hinder 
cooperation. 
• Sustainability of tourism 
industry. 
• Sustainability of project 
when tourism is low.  
• Maintaining incentive to 
participate before project 
results can be fully realized.  
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Rhino Custodianship Program (RCP) and The Rhino Rangers Incentive Program 
(RRIP):   
 Namibia has been experiencing an increase in poaching, even though its 
elephant and rhino populations remain relatively stable and on Annex II of the CITES 
Convention (Muntifering et.al, 2015; Hambo et.al, 2015).  Both the RCP and RRIP’s 
focus has been on monitoring and improving rhino protection initiatives with the use 
of modern technology and on the job skills development initiatives by engaging 
community members with government authorities and conservation specialists. Non-
financial community-focused incentives are driven by the allocation of goods and 
equipment such as camping gear, uniforms and vehicles. The RCP reposts that since 
the provision of non-financial benefits community based monitoring of rhinos has 
dramatically improved quantity and quality of community engagement (Muntifering 
et.al, 2015) The RCP and RRIP studies suggest that security for the rhino will be 
increased by tightening tourism regulations and boosting the number of rangers, 
scouts and eco-guards that operate within the projects jurisdiction (Muntifering et.al, 
2015; Hambo et.al, 2015). By involving rangers, scouts and eco-guards in eco-tourism 
initiatives by employing them as guides, the conservation industry becomes directly 
intertwined with the tourism industry, adding strategic benefits to conservation 
initiatives as now there are more financial opportunities tied to the rhino through 
rhino-tourism. The merging of the two industries also implies that revenue generated 
from rhino protection will not only benefit those involved in conservation, but rhino-
tourism will also provide additional benefits to the broader community and allow for 
the development opportunities of private-enterprise.  
 The RCP study found that after a period of two years from the point of 
implementation, the project experienced a twelve-fold increase in rhino custodians 
who actively monitor rhinos on communal land (Muntifering et.al, 2015).  Regionally, 
the project experienced a tripling of trained and equipped rhino monitoring personnel 
(Muntifering et.al, 2015). The findings of the RCP suggest that their community 
engagement strategy proved successful; where in 2011 no rhinos where spotted on 
community land compared to 272 rhino sightings in the year 2014 (Muntifering et.al, 
2015). Notably, approximately 40% of the regions rhinos live on rhino custodian land, 
where in 2014 only 22% of poaching cases occurred within the projects premises 
(Muntifering et.al, 2015; Hambo et.al, 2015).  
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 The RCP is an initiative that was created on request of community members, 
therefore strong local interest and support was already a driving factor from the 
outset. In addition, both the RCP and RRIP program are driven by locals rather than 
an external NGO or government agency. This direct collaboration with incentivized 
locals has fostered a clearer idea of the approaches needed to understanding the 
elements of the program that will maximize the values local people place on 
protecting rhinos. The findings of the RCP and RRIP also suggest that the provision 
of uniforms, team building events, training seminars, performance-based bonus 
payments and certificates of achievement in exams have helped to increase notions of 
pride and prestige for their role in conservation, thus fostering community enthusiasm 
to become a member of the RCP initiative (Muntifering et.al, 2015; Hambo et.al, 
2015).   
 The programs both introduced rhino profile cards with information on the 
animals life and history to aid rangers in the identification of individual rhinos 
(Muntifering et.al, 2015; Hambo et.al, 2015). These types of tools do not only 
improve identification, but they also help to build a relationship between the rangers 
and the rhinos they are protecting. Naming and knowing the animal on a more 
personal level helps to create a stronger sense of responsibility, thereby increasing 
incentive to protect it.  
 Since the implementation of rhino custodianship programs, tolerance towards 
poaching has reduced (Muntifering et.al, 2015; Hambo et.al, 2015). Community 
members aid with the recording and reporting of criminal or suspicious activity to the 
appropriate official agencies (Muntifering et.al, 2015; Hambo et.al, 2015). This 
engagement between communities and officials helps to align enforcement based and 
incentive based strategies as locals become more willing to work with law 
enforcement authorities and detect and report instances of poaching. According to the 
RCP, the increase in the reporting and recording of sightings of both rhinos and 
criminal activity, suggests that there is an improvement in community level pro-rhino 
attitude and conservation incentive (Muntifering et.al, 2015).  However, both the RCP 
and RRIP reported challenges in sustaining local incentive and support while training 
was ongoing, primarily at times when the project was in its roll-out phase and the 
financial benefits and enterprise development opportunities were not fully realized 
and appreciated (Muntifering et.al, 2015; Hambo et.al, 2015). This stipulates that the 
community-driven demand for rhino protection is financially incentivized rather than 
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driven out of interest for species conservation. Thus, tourism-dependent projects run 
the risk that at times when tourism is low, the revenues will not be enough to maintain 
desired income levels. With the increasing price for ivory and rhino horn, the appeal 
of poaching is likely increase as people seek out alternative income generating 
activities.  
 
Domestic Dimension  
 Domestic, socio-economic issues that drive poaching require community 
participation in conservation initiatives. Considering the assumption of financially 
motivated rational choice, from a rationalist perspective, it can be assumed that 
people are driven to poach by mainly financial incentives to increase their ‘utility’ or 
‘happiness’, especially when living in conditions of socio-economic inequality and 
poverty. Notably however, the findings in the cases of South Africa, Kenya and 
Namibia suggest that the cultural value of the animals to national heritage must also 
be considered. Non-financially driven incentives to protect elephant and rhino 
populations, such as the prestige associated with protecting this heritage, or the 
human-wildlife bond created through conservation initiatives, must also be accounted 
for as factors motivating people to engage in protecting them.  
 The case studies found that providing rangers and eco-guards with non-
financial incentives such as uniforms, tools, camping gear and vehicles aided in 
keeping motivation to participate high. However, rather than being driven by concern 
for biodiversity, these ‘non-financial’ incentives nevertheless represent incentives 
driven by material gains to increase utility as assumed by rational choice. Although 
this is not necessarily a negative aspect, it stipulates that people can be encouraged to 
participate in conservation if they are able to gain utility from receiving basic 
resources such as uniforms, tools and materials as a type of incentive payment for 
their involvement. Furthermore, a sense of prestige also becomes associated with 
wearing rangers uniforms, especially as norms towards wildlife conservation change 
within communities (King & Craig, 2015; Cottar, 2015).  This fosters incentive to 
become a ranger or protector, whilst also developing a sense of unity through the 
involvement of different tribes under a common purpose. As wildlife protection rather 
than poaching becomes a norm, the social stigma of poaching becomes strengthened 
as well. As prescribed in pathway one in the Theory of Change (TOC), communities 
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are effective mechanisms for strengthening disincentives of poaching through the 
application of social sanctions against poachers or by joining conservation activities 
as rangers, scouts and eco-guards (Biggs et.al, 2016). In the cases of South Africa and 
Namibia, where conservation projects were either requested by community members 
(Namibia), or where protection incentives at community level were particularly high 
(Namibia and South Africa), poachers are mainly externally hired outsiders and 
middlemen. However, in the cases of Tanzania and Kenya where projects are 
primarily implemented and governed by NGO’s or local authorities aiming to educate 
and engage community members, poachers are mostly locals financed by outsiders. 
This difference stipulates that the success of anti-poaching strategies is to some extent 
dependent on the norms within society, and whether these have evolved to where 
poaching is stigmatized within communities, or whether financial incentives of 
poaching are still able outweigh these social norms – or be lucrative enough to push 
individuals to go against the norms within their community. The growing demand for 
ivory and rhino horn from Asia represents a risk to the maintenance of these norms. 
As the price for these bush commodities increases, so may incentives to turn to 
poaching when the revenues generated by engaging in poaching outweigh the 
revenues from eco-tourism, land leasing and protection. Thus the development of 
community driven solutions to poaching is becoming increasingly more necessary for 
successful and sustainable conservation strategies.  
   From the findings in the aforementioned case studies it can be stipulated that 
the most important element for success of community driven incentives is the 
provision of alternative livelihoods. This follows pathway two of the TOC, which 
encourages enterprise development and the support of initiatives that generate 
financial benefits for local communities (Biggs et.al, 2016). This includes the 
development of the ecotourism industry and the training and education of locals as 
either guides or rangers, or both. The output of this is that communities are able to 
capture greater benefits from wildlife, whether financially or non-financially. Thus, 
through the assumption of rational choice, conserving wildlife adds greater financial 
value to elephants and rhinos as a living commodity, and in return, people’s utility 
from keeping populations alive is increased through ecotourism and employment 
initiatives. The outcome of this is that communities will have greater incentive to 
protect wildlife. As such, the best solution to tackling incentives to poach at the 
community level is through the provision of economic alternatives. The evidence of 
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this is presented in the findings of all the case studies, through the successful 
establishment of ecotourism enterprise or land leasing initiatives that generate 
alternative sources income.  
 Furthermore, the findings of the studies indicate that local engagement in 
poaching is due to a manifestation of other issues such as lack of purpose and lack of 
good relationships between authorities and communities (Swai & Lotter, 2015; King 
& Craig, 2015; Cottar, 2015; Muntifering et.al, 2015). In order to fulfill purpose 
within communities, conservation projects must ensure that ownership remains within 
communities and offers possibilities for engagement in initiatives by providing 
alternative land use. Conservancy land is traditionally owned by local communities 
that preserve a strong cultural right over the land and its management. In order to 
foster strong cooperation between communities and authorities, NGO’s and 
government must be recognized as a viable partner in improving livelihoods rather 
than as an outside entity threatening to take control over their land (Muntifering et.al, 
2015; Hambo et.al, 2015; King & Craig, 2015; Cottar, 2015;).  Similarly, authorities 
must also recognize communities as a valuable partner to the success of conservation 
initiatives.  Working towards a common cause enhances incentive to participate in 
wildlife protection and helps to ensure that the anticipated outcome is sustained. 
Conservancies can cover hundreds of kilometers of land – areas that are too large for 
authorities to control without the aid of the locals that are already available on the 
land (Roe, 2015). The employment of community members as rangers, observers and 
reporters does not only create alternative livelihoods, but also increases government 
awareness of the activities on conservancy land. The engagement of community 
members and their collaboration with authorities allows for access to areas where 
traditional law enforcement may not have access, as reflected in the findings of the 
Kenyan case study (King and Craig, 2015). With the establishment of strong 
community-government relationships, activities on conservancy land will thus 
become more transparent and easier to monitor and manage. It is crucial that 
conservation strategies do not exclude locals, but are managed through high levels of 
community engagement with integrated support from government and law 
enforcement specifically to aid in addressing the driving factors that are outside the 
capacity of community members – such as the increasing armed violence of poachers.  
 In addition, there is an increasing need to militarize anti-poaching strategies 
because conservation and security concerns are becoming further integrated. 
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Poachers, represented by outsiders, are often affiliated to terrorist organizations or 
criminal syndicates. In response, government and conservationists are turning towards 
strategies of contemporary warfare to be able to meet the increased violence of 
poachers (Duffy, 2016).    
 The benefits of top-down solutions, such as increased security and militarized 
responses, are that threats of violent killings of rhino’s and elephants are directly met 
by equal means of protection. By protecting species populations, locals are indirectly 
protected from economic insecurity as the iconic species attract tourists, therefore 
adding to the stability and development of the eco-tourism industry. 
 However, conservation by the use of increased militarized means also creates 
a security threat. As derived from the findings in the cases, people who go to 
conservatories to poach are oftentimes outsiders who are equipped with military grade 
weaponry and technology – and who thus must be met by similar means to deter them 
from poaching. Due to the lucrative nature of the industry, it can be stipulated that the 
violence of poachers is not likely to decrease; therefore conservationist-poacher 
clashes are likely to add to a notion of regional instability. In effect, this can deter 
tourists’ willingness to participate in ecotourism in the region due to a fear of 
escalating security threats. As a result, the ecotourism industry is likely to suffer, 
which will damage community development and can negatively affect the success of 
bottom-up solutions because incentives to engage in wildlife protection change. As 
such, although necessary, increasing the militarization of anti-poaching strategies can 
lead to undesired negative externalities in the socio-economic dimension of 
conservation. 
 Another problem of increasing military responses to poaching is that the 
strategy does not tackle poaching effectively because it does not address mechanisms 
to strategically combatting cross-border movements of poachers, nor does it address 
socio-economic solutions to the bottom-up drivers of poaching. Instead, top-down 
investment in surveillance and technology, and the development of intelligence led-
strategies, acts as counterproductive distractions to addressing the socio-economic 
issues at community level (Duffy, 2016; Douglas & Alie, 2014). Thus, focusing 
solely on security strategies is not a comprehensive solution to poaching because it 
fails to address the socio-economic solutions to poaching by locals. Applying this 
type of approach at community level will likely increase poverty and inequality due to 
lack of government investment in wildlife-based enterprise opportunities. 
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Furthermore, investing in primarily security strategies can increase collusion with 
government and authorities and foster the prevalence of criminal networks as people 
seek alternative sources of income and enterprise if the industry from conservation is 
not properly developed (Duffy, 2016; Douglas & Alie, 2014; Hambo et.al, 2015).  
 
International Dimension  
 Although the case studies do not address the mechanisms by which to tackle 
the threat of poaching by outsiders and criminal syndicates on an international scale, 
the findings suggest that poaching driven by external actors require different solutions 
than poaching driven by community members, thereby supporting H2 of this study. 
 Whilst bottom-up solutions can deter incentives to poach at community level 
by tackling socio-economic issues, the threats by outside actors require government-
driven solutions that address the security risks these external actors impose.  
 Responses to organized transnational criminal networks that engage in 
poaching require international cooperation and the deployment of armed forces. 
Kenya and Tanzania have porous borders, neighbored by some of the world’s most 
fragile states (Haas, & Ferreira, 2016).  The security implication is that illegal activity 
can flow uncontrolled between states, specifically between Somalia, South Sudan and 
the DRC through to Kenya, and Tanzania (Schiffman, 2014). This strongly 
undermines the success of bottom-up initiatives. As a solution, the additional 
employment of community members as border patrol officers could aid with the 
management of this issue.  
 If the cross-border flows of outsiders and their illegal activity is not 
adequately managed, then the presence of outsiders promising financial rewards for 
poaching to locals is likely to increase as well. This is supported in the cases of Kenya 
and Tanzania, where issues of porous borders are reported to be a driving factor 
influencing the prevalence of poaching (King & Craig, 2015; Cottar, 2015). The 
increased presence of outsiders also heightens the risks of engaging in wildlife 
protection, which can deter locals from becoming rangers, scouts and protectors. As a 
solution, the involvement of international NGO’s and donors is crucial for the success 
of conservation programs because they are able to offer the financial and non-
financial incentives that encourage community participation. In the case of Tanzania, 
the findings suggest that community engagement can be maintained as long as the 
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rewards outweigh the risks and that community members are quick to receive 
compensation for losses, whether financial or non-financial (Muruthi, 2015; (Swai & 
Lotter, 2015; Roe, 2015).    
 Even though countries like Kenya and Tanzania have taken a public stance on 
fighting the illicit industry through the burning of tonnes of confiscated ivory and 
rhino horn, the increasing size of the seizures by authorities reflects that poaching in 
the region is not under control or decreasing, despite conservation efforts (Ewing 
et.al, 2014). The volume of illegal ivory and rhino horn trade has tripled since 1998 
(Ewing et.al, 2014). Comprehensive top-down solutions to the international 
movement of poachers have not yet been developed, and poaching is likely to 
continue to escalate if these issues are not adequately addressed.  
 The revenues from ivory and rhino horn have been linked to the funding of 
criminal syndicates and terrorist organizations, such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the 
Janjaweed or the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Poe, 2014). The operational income 
from ivory and rhino horn is used to obtain weapons, which ultimately fuels the 
conflict and insecurity that originally allowed for opportunities of poaching to occur – 
as a result, causing a steady cycle of violence (Ewing et.al, 2014; Vira et.al, 2014). 
The security implication of this is that if these organizations continue to obtain 
income from the high-valued ivory and rhino horn, it will likely contribute to regional 
instability, which in effect is likely to deter tourists from visiting the region and thus 
decrease valuable revenues from tourism. Consequently, it is probable that this will 
challenge the success of socio-economically focused conservation programs that are 
largely dependent on the ecotourism industry. As such, combatting high levels of 
ivory and rhino horn trade in Kenya and Tanzania requires a strong government 
crackdown on corruption, crime and terrorism; and an increase in the deployment of 
border patrol, police and armed forces at the porous borders to fragile states. 
Comparatively, in South Africa and Namibia, where there is relative political stability 
and lower corruption rates, elephant and rhino poaching is largely kept in check 
(Schiffman, 2014). The success of their conservation efforts is reflected in the species 
CITES Annex II status. This has been achieved through aggressive patrolling, 
development of community-based conservation initiatives, harsh fines and 
imprisonment and a crackdown on corruption by authorities (Schiffman, 2014).   
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 The eradication of iconic species and the funding of terrorist organizations and 
criminal networks from the ivory and rhino horn trade is not only an African issue, 
but one with international implications.  
 The following tables below provide an overview of the findings. The table 
demonstrating the findings can be understood using the grid below:  
 
Table 9.    G R I D  
 PROBLEM PROBLEM 
PROBLEM Solutions Solutions 
PROBLEM Solutions Solutions 
 
Table 10.        F I N D I N G S  O VE R VI EW   
 DOMESTIC  INTERNATIONAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
Solutions mainly require 
bottom-up initiatives with 
government support and 
investment. This includes: 
• Increasing the 
economic value of 
protecting wildlife 
through ecotourism.   
• Enhancing human 
bonds with wildlife 
through animal 
profiling. 
• Provision of non-
financial incentives 
to participate in 
protection. 
•  Creating alternative 
livelihoods by 
hiring locals as 
rangers, scouts and 
guards. 
• Creating alternative 
livelihoods by 
hiring locals in eco-
tourism enterprises.  
• Social sanctions by 
communities 
against poachers.  
• Changing norms to 
favor protection by 
increasing 
economic value of 
species.   
Although this aspect is not within the scope 
of this thesis, solutions to socio-economic 
drivers on an international scale entail 
policies and initiatives that reduce the 
demand from Asia (National Geographic 
Press, 2015). 
Mechanisms by which demand can be 
reduced include: 
• Government led awareness 
campaigns.  
• Tightening law enforcement 
efforts. 
• Fighting corruption. 
• Strengthen public education 
programs dismissing the traditional 
beliefs regarding the use of ivory 
and rhino horn. 
• Prohibiting the sale and purchase of 
ivory on Asian markets.  
• Taking advantage of the Internet 
and social media to stigmatize 
buying the commodity.  
• Collaborating with international 
organizations and treaty bodies to 
aid with combatting the trade.  
• Reducing the perception of ivory as 
a status symbol.  
• Increasing fines and imprisonment 
for people who are caught buying 
and selling ivory. 
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Table 10. (Continued) 
 DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                SECURITY 
Solutions mainly require top-
down initiatives paired with 
community participation. This 
includes:  
• Involving tribes in 
monitoring and 
protecting species.  
• Government protection 
of locals who 
participate in 
protection. 
• Fostering collaboration 
between authorities and 
community members to 
allow access to 
community land. 
• Intelligence gathering 
initiatives by both 
authorities and 
communities.  
• Increased investment in 
military grade 
technology and 
weapons. 
• Increased investment in 
armed forces and 
police training.  
• Increasing investment 
in training of rangers, 
both armed and 
unarmed.   
• Harsher punishment for 
poaching.  
• Government 
crackdown on 
corruption.  
• Increasing international 
NGO, think-tank and 
donor involvement. 
Solutions require predominantly 
top-down initiatives that are 
able to meet the increased 
security threats by outsiders. 
This includes:  
• Enhanced cooperation 
between states to 
monitor and control 
borders in order to curb 
the illegal flow people 
and contraband.  
• Deployment of armed 
forces. 
• Employment of 
community members 
from different tribes 
and states to 
collaborate in border 
patrol activities.  
• Investment in anti-
terror initiatives.  
• Harsher punishment for 
poaching.  
• Government 
crackdown on 
transnational 
corruption.  
• Increasing involvement 
of international 
organizations and think 
tanks.  
• Increase cooperation 
with international 
policing agencies.  
• Increase investment in 
research to determine a 
clear framework on the 
interlinking 
relationships between 
poachers, criminal 
organizations and 
buyers.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The findings of this study suggest there is no panacea to the poaching 
problem. The phenomenon is a complex issue that requires a multifaceted strategy to 
combatting it. On the one hand, socio-economically focused approaches are more 
successful at reducing poaching at the community level than solely security focused 
strategies, thus supporting H1 of this study. As such, the findings of the case studies 
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indicate that under the right conditions socio-economically driven strategies can be 
highly effective solutions to reducing the incentive by locals to poach. However, the 
development of concrete security driven strategies to reduce the illegal movements 
and activities of outsiders is also crucial for the success of community driven 
solutions. Poaching and the illegal wildlife commodity trade have significant negative 
impacts on communities who are affected by the insecurity created through this 
industry. In addition, the insecurity created through the strengthening of violent 
militarized responses to poaching negatively affects community development and the 
success of bottom-up solutions. In order to develop effective community management 
strategies, top-down solutions must also identify and draw a distinction between 
poverty driven crimes of need and crimes of greed driven by criminal syndicates. The 
former can be successfully combatted through an inclusive framework of socio-
economic strategies as demonstrated in the findings of the case studies. If 
communities recognize the financial value of wildlife populations, the incentive to 
engage in combatting poaching and protecting species will be higher in return. 
However, if local communities do not participate in wildlife management, and 
conservation generates no socio-economic benefits, incentives for illegal use will be 
higher as well. Even the most well-resourced top-down enforcement strategies will 
struggle to control poaching if they do not receive community support and active 
participation. The findings of the case studies demonstrate a strong alignment with the 
pathways as described in the TOC, thus suggesting that the preconditions and 
assumptions as provided by the theory are a good indication of best practice regarding 
community driven solutions. It is therefore crucial to maximize the development of 
socio-economic strategies to strengthen the incentives that drive communities to 
protect endangered species populations – not just to benefit themselves, but for their 
future generations, for the international community and for the preservation of 
biodiversity.   
 Furthermore, there is an urgent need for future studies to establish transparent 
and concrete links between terrorism and the ivory and rhino horn trade to enhance 
cooperation and engagement by the international community. It is evident that the 
revenues from ivory and rhino horn help fund criminal syndicates and terror 
organizations that carry out activities which threaten international security. This 
problematic security dynamic should add a sense of urgency for the international 
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community to combat the drivers of poaching on both the supply and demand side of 
the phenomenon. 
 The findings suggest that international security and conservation concerns are 
becoming further integrated and thus require solutions that address the drivers both 
domestically and internationally. As such, solutions to the socio-economic and 
security dimensions that drive poaching are not mutually exclusive. The movement of 
criminal activity across porous borders negatively impacts the success of community 
driven initiatives. Members of criminal syndicates offer relatively high financial 
rewards to locals to encourage them to engage in wildlife tracking and poaching 
activities. In addition, cross border movements of criminals seeking to obtain revenue 
from ivory and rhino horn add to domestic instability by clashing with rangers, police 
and armed forces. As a result, this adds to a notion of insecurity and can deter tourists 
from participating in wildlife tourism initiatives in the area, severely affecting the 
success of bottom-up solutions and damaging the opportunities for alternative 
livelihoods provided by the ecotourism industry. With the failure of alternative 
livelihood opportunities, locals may gain incentive to participate in illicit activities 
such as poaching to generate income, thus further contributing to the vicious cycle of 
violence and poverty that affects both people and wildlife.  
 The complexity of combating poaching and its affiliated industries requires 
close cooperation between conservationists, NGO’s, international organizations, 
government agencies and research institutions because solutions to the various 
dimensions require an interdisciplinary effort with an integrated approach. The 
European Parliament produced a resolution on wildlife crime in 2014, which includes 
government-level support on wide ranging initiatives from intelligence gathering, 
strengthening of enforcement, revised penalties for poachers, trade moratoria and 
judiciary system reform (European Parliament, 2014).  Notably however, out of the 
thirty propositions only one initiative was directed towards communities and the 
promotion of alternative livelihood strategies.  
 The findings of this study highlight the importance of developing community 
driven strategies in order to create a more inclusive approach to conservation 
initiatives that both protects wildlife and fosters local development. Traditional focus 
by researchers on law enforcement mechanisms and the demand side drivers must 
shift to include strategies that enhance economic development through the support of 
alternative livelihoods that reduce local incentive to poach. Adding financial benefits 
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to keeping wildlife alive will encourage its protection. There is no blueprint approach 
that establishes a concrete framework on community engagement strategies and 
which documents and evaluates the effectiveness of bottom-up solutions in any kind 
of systematic way. This thesis aims to encourage future researchers and policy makers 
to increase their focus on the socio-economic drivers of poaching and the respective 
top-down or bottom-up solutions.  
 Finally, the findings indicate that there is a significant relationship between 
poaching and terrorism as the revenues from ivory and rhino horn fund the criminal 
syndicates that carry out terror activities (Poe, 2014; Kalrom et.al, 2013).  Escalating 
terror threats will not only affect the success of bottom-up solutions to the socio-
economic drivers of poaching on a domestic scale but also have international 
repercussions. It is evident that combatting the cross border movement of external 
actors and their illicit activities requires international cooperation and government 
driven solutions. However, there is a lack of research and literature that establishes a 
clear framework on the mechanisms by which these actors and syndicates are 
interlinked, where exactly they operate and the financial flows that fund their 
activities. Hopefully, the findings of this thesis will encourage future research to 
develop on bridging this knowledge gap as it is impossible to successfully counter the 
problem of poaching and the affiliated international crime if it is not fully understood.  
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